ABSTRACT
not always insured MMFs. Money market funds are viewed by their shareholders as providing the same safe cash management services provided by banks, albeit with generally higher yields and more limited transactional services. Over the last three decades, MMFs have steadily siphoned shortterm cash from banks to the point where MMFs, whose $4 trillion in assets now rival bank deposits totaling $8.7 trillion, have assumed a similarly crucial role in the payments system. It was the threat to the payments system, among other risks, of an imminent run on MMF assets that prompted the Treasury to roll out the temporary MMF guarantee. If the purpose of deposit insurance is to provide a government guarantee of safe cash accounts, in part to ensure the stability of the payments system, then
MMFs, like banks, should be insured. Indeed, the argument for insuring MMFs is much stronger than for banks because MMFs present significantly less risk. 2 In times of market stress, the nature of an MMF's assets makes it far less susceptible to failure than a bank, as reflected by the long history of bank failures and the almost perfect record of MMFs.
3 Money market funds and banks both are funded by short-term liabilities in the form of demand accounts, but they make very different investments with their cash. Money market funds in effect make short-term loans, such as through purchases of 60-day commercial paper. The term of an MMF's liabilities (demand accounts) therefore hues closely to the term of its assets (short-term loans).
In contrast, banks make long-term loans with maturities that can run for decades, such as 30-year mortgages. This term-mismatch between a bank's liabilities (demand deposits) and its assets (long-term loans) creates
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Insured Money Market Funds 3 liquidity risk. Long-term loans are less liquid and their value is more variable than short-term loans. Therefore, the underwriting of bank risk is more complex than for MMFs, and banks are more susceptible than MMFs to failure in the event of a surge of withdrawals by depositors (the proverbial "run on the bank") because they are less able than MMFs, in times of market stress, to quickly convert their assets to cash without suffering large losses. 4 An economist might ask what it means to argue that insuring smaller risks is necessarily safer than insuring larger risks. When risk is efficiently priced by an insurer, the insurer generally should be indifferent to the magnitude or likelihood of the potential loss. Over the long term, insurers that fail to price risk efficiently will be unprofitable or become insolvent, and those that price risk efficiently will be rewarded. Similarly, if the government efficiently priced bank risk it would be indifferent to the magnitude of the potential losses. But government-sponsored deposit insurance necessarily reflects political goals that often are inconsistent with efficiency values. 5 The potential for political influence and inefficiency increases with the complexity of the risk and the variance of potential claims. The risks entailed by MMF portfolios are smaller and less complex, and the variance of potential MMF losses is substantially narrower, than for banks.
This essay argues that making MMF insurance permanent would reduce inefficiency created by government-sponsored insurance for cash accounts. Admittedly, it might seem counterintuive to suggest that creating a new government program would reduce rather than increase such inefficiencies. In an ideally efficient world, all insurance would be provided by private markets. But this essay takes government-sponsored insurance for cash accounts as a given, in which case insuring MMFs would improve efficiency by reducing the financial markets' exposure to the distorting effect of deposit insurance. For decades, consumers have been moving cash from banks to MMFs even without the inducement of federal insurance. Making MMF insurance permanent would likely accelerate this disintermediation of bank deposits to MMFs. Every insured dollar that is exposed to term-matched MMF risk rather than term-mismatched bank risk would be a dollar that was less likely to be lost with taxpayers left to make accountholders whole. Insuring MMFs would not lead directly to eliminating government insurance, but it would represent a significant step down the path of least government insurance.
The same goal could be accomplished in a bank-like structure.
Deposit insurance could be offered to deposits that are invested only in assets subject to the same kind of constraints that apply to MMFs. Such a term-matched bank is known as a "narrow bank." 6 In order to compete with MMFs, this new type of narrow bank could be relieved of regulatory burdens that do not apply to MMFs, such as the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"), while also retaining the advantages of their central role in the payments system and their access to the Federal Reserve discount window. Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking, supra note 7 (discussing liquidity-creating role of banks); Miller, supra at 63@&A(/B%(-&C7&D#(/%E)2%*&3.4#,56'7*,$0)*8.9'3#': >' 3.4#,56'7*,$0) REV. 373, 374 -75 (2008) ("Increasingly, the financial system is characterized by disintermediation, which enables companies to access the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets, without going through banks or other financial intermediaries."); Bossone, supra ("it is undoubtedly the case that in the advanced economies nonbank quasi-money and financing products are taking increasing business shares away from banks"); Akash Deep & Guido Schaefer, Deposit Insurance: An Outmoded Lifeboat for Today 's Sea of Liquidity? AFA 2002 Atlanta Meeting, at 8, 11 -13 (2001 ("The evolution of capital market instruments like corporate bonds, commercial paper, mutual funds, money-market funds and securitized assets has significantly undercut the relative size and scope of the banking sector as liquidity providers.") available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=295760; Miller, supra at 67. suppressing the development of private liquidity sources, such as private insurance, lines of credit, and other mechanisms that provide a better structural fit for managing liquidity risk than using government-sponsored insurance to dissuade depositors from withdrawing their funds.
But this commentary on deposit insurance goes further than necessary for purposes of this essay, which argues only for the mutual coexistence of insurance for term-mismatched banks, narrow banks and MMFs, not for the abolition of term-mismatched deposit insurance. In any case, there is no practical possibility that the current deposit insurance regime will be eliminated in the foreseeable future. In the current environment, it may be more likely that deposit insurance will gain a stronger political foothold. 9 The real practical question is whether banking interests will prevail not only in stripping insurance from MMFs, but in subjecting them to a banking regulatory regime and thereby removing a significant competitive threat to banks and banking regulators' turf. Although banks also invest in some highly liquid investments, they do not make any pretense of standing ready to liquidate their assets on short notice to honor a mass exodus of depositors.
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Bank regulations employ two principal mechanisms to minimize the risk created by banks' term-mismatched assets and liabilities.
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One mechanism is FDIC insurance, which protects the vast majority of bank depositors against loss and mitigates their incentive to rush for the exits during times of financial uncertainty.
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The second mechanism is a complex set of risk-based rules that are designed to maintain a constant equity buffer between the value of a bank's assets and amount of its mismatch. The combination of illiquid assets and liquid demand deposits makes a bank financially fragile."). Diamond & Rajan, supra note 7, at 289 (discussing banks' "fragile capital structure"). 29 The technical term for this is "fractional reserve banking," but it is best illustrated in the dramatic scene in the 1946 movie It's a Wonderful Life in which George Bailey (played by Jimmy Stewart) explains to panicking bank customers: "You're thinking of this place all wrong, as if I had the money back in the safe." 30 Spong, supra note 6, at 12 -13 ("This traditional bank asset/liability structure violates the basic principles of financial management by failing to provide an asset base with sufficient liquidity and security to support withdrawable deposits."). 31 Because regulation is a part of the political process, as well as a market surrogate, the thrust toward efficiency that a market generates is blunted. The point is not that regulatory agencies deliberately squander resources (theirs or the regulated firms') but that they are often constrained to pursue goals that are incompatible with efficient resource use, such as the subsidization of favored customers or small sellers.
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If governments are less likely to accurately assess the risks of insuring demand accounts, then the best risk for the government to insure is the one least likely to result in losses, the losses of which are likely to be smallest, and the potential harm of inefficient (government) 379, 382 (1978) . 43 A narrow bank, like an MMF, would pose a smaller risk of loss and or government inefficiency. See Scott, supra note 2, at 89 (discussing a narrow bank: "the existence of an active trading market would enable the bank's asset portfolio to be marked-to-market on a daily basis at little cost, and the bank to be closed swiftly at negligible loss if it should become insolvent.") & 91 (MMF losses "a mere trifle in relation to losses encountered in bank failures"). Scott also argues that steering consumer deposits to narrow banks (or, implicitly, to MMFs) would leave funding of long-term ventures to institutions and more sophisticated investors that would be less likely "to be able to obtain a political bailout in the event of a loss." Id. at 89. 44 to newly created narrow banks that are subject to prudential regulation similar to rule 2a-7 and freed of social obligations (e.g., CRA requirements) would further expand the free market for government-insured intermediation of short-term capital.
One objection to providing permanent MMF insurance is that the resulting disintermediation from banks to MMFs would reduce liquidity creation in the financial markets. Proponents of this liquidity creation theory of exclusive deposit insurance contend that: (1) net societal wealth is increased by enabling banks to convert short-term deposits into long-term assets, (2) insuring short-term deposits is necessary to prevent a run on banks by depositors, and (3) insuring MMFs accounts would reduce net societal wealth by disintermediating demand deposits from banks to MMFs and thereby reducing the availability of short-term sources of capital to long-term ventures. 45 They argue that, if insuring MMFs significantly accelerated the outflow of demand accounts from banks to MMFs, net liquidity creation would be reduced, which could strangle financial markets.
Financing for long-term ventures could dry up and economic growth could be suppressed.
There are many flaws in this argument, the first of which is that there is no clear evidence that the availability of deposit insurance actually increases liquidity creation. The literature espousing the liquidity creation theory of deposit insurance is largely theoretical. Almost no research has been done on the actual correlation between deposit insurance and liquidity creation. Only one study has specifically addressed whether deposit committee were allowed to remain open longer than were other undercapitalized banks"). Spong, supra note 6, at 14. 45 See generally Bossone, supra note 7, at 13; Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393 (1984) (financial intermediaries monitor loan performance and thus reduce monitoring costs for individual lenders); Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, supra note 7 (banks will be able to transform illiquid assets into liquid assets as long as investors maintain their confidence to the banking system). [2-Mar-09 insurance increases liquidity creation, which concluded that: the amount of liquidity transformed by US commercial banks is surprisingly low. The evidence suggests that protection offered by deposit insurance, the putative objective of which is to protect banks against the risk of liquidity crises, has only modest success in promoting liquidity transformation. 46 The authors found that, rather than enhancing the flow of capital to longterm enterprises, deposit insurance was correlated with increased investment in riskier short-term assets. This finding would be a reason to eliminate deposit insurance, not to make it available, much less exclusively available, to banks.
Even assuming that insuring bank deposits enhances liquidity creation, there is no evidence that banks' role in liquidity is so important as to warrant an exclusive insurance franchise. Decades ago, banks might have been critical suppliers of credit to long-term ventures because capital markets arguably did not offer adequate alternatives for such ventures to access short-term cash. However, the credit markets have become substantially diversified with a variety of non-bank service providers providing access to short-term capital not derived from bank deposits. 47 The claim that banks as such are essential cogs in the machinery of liquidity creation is no longer viable. Securitization of various asset classes has provided broad access to short-term capital for long-term ventures, thereby 46 Liquidity? supra note 8, at 8, [11] [12] [13] ("The evolution of capital market instruments like corporate bonds, commercial paper, mutual funds, money-market funds and securitized assets has significantly undercut the relative size and scope of the banking sector as liquidity providers.") available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=295760. 49 See Sellon, supra note 48, at 65 -66 (role of securitization of mortgages in displacing banks). 50 See Spong, supra note 6, at 8 (increasing investment in stock, bond and money market mutual funds "at the expense of banks"). 51 53 See Are Banks Liquidity Transformers? supra note 49, at 2; Spong, supra note 6, at 8 ("it is unlikely that bank deposits will ever regain the importance they once held in the portfolios of banking customers"). the federal insurance subsidy, 58 and if federal insurance were extended to non-banks the banking industry would demand that the CRA apply to all such entities or that the CRA be abolished for banks. Neither option is politically viable in the near term.
See generally
On the one hand, the MMF insurance program should not be conditioned on MMFs' being subject to the CRA. On the other hand, banks
should not be forced to compete with MMFs that have the advantage of being CRA-free. A practicable solution would be to insure both MMFs and newly created narrow banks without either type of entity being subject to the CRA. 59 The CRA currently does not apply to MMFs, and it is unlikely that public interest groups would insist on CRA coverage as a condition for making federal MMF insurance permanent (they have not objected to CRAfree temporary MMF insurance). Public interest groups might view an insured narrow bank as threatening to drain assets from CRA-covered banking activities to narrow banks, but functionally this is no different from the long-term shrinking of the CRA's reach through disintermediation of short-term assets from banks to MMFs.
60
Notwithstanding the distorting effect of deposit insurance and the lack of empirical support for the liquidity creation theory, there is no realistic possibility that deposit insurance will be eliminated or even reduced in the near-term. Indeed, the current crisis has resulted in a 58 See, e.g., Michael Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 198 -202 (2005) (subsidies such as deposit insurance partly justify imposition of CRA requirements on banks). 59 See Ronnie Phillips, Credit Markets and Narrow Banking, Levy Institute Working Paper No. 77 at 12 (1992) ("Perhaps the strongest argument for narrow banking, however, is that it allows a way out of the federal deposit insurance mess."); Spong, supra note 6, at 12 ("narrow banking would eliminate the fundamental problem in the current banking system -deposits available at par and on demand that are backed with illiquid risky loans.").
60 Whatever one's position on the CRA, imposing community lending requirements on only one source of loans ultimately will undermine its efficacy. The CRA-bank connection, like the FDIC insurance-bank connection, needs to be reconsidered in light of the diversification of sources of capital. Over time, the additional costs of the CRA will either drive assets to non-bank financial intermediaries (thereby reducing the CRA's reach) or require continuing indirect, market-distorting subsidies to banks to compensate them for this expense.
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[2-Mar-09 temporary expansion of deposit insurance that is likely to become permanent.
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Policymakers therefore should pursue the path of least insurance by insuring cash management vehicles that are safer, less likely to experience large losses, and present more commoditized, less complex underwriting challenges. The creation of the temporary MMF insurance program has provided a political opportunity to make progress on the path of least insurance by making this program permanent and establishing insured narrow banks. As insured demand account assets continue to shift from term-mismatched banks to MMFs and narrow banks, short-term capital would be free to find the highest value user among a broader range of short-term capital intermediaries. These steps would also bring about incidental benefits, such as enhancing the stability of the payments system, 62 reducing the risk to unsophisticated depositors created by arbitrary and confusing FDIC coverage limits, 63 and reducing the systemic risk and moral hazard created by deposit insurance. There is no longer any rational basis for granting banks an exclusive government insurance franchise for demand accounts. The current financial crisis demonstrates that public insuring of financial risk, whether through explicit insurance programs or implied guarantees, must account for the full spectrum of 61 See supra note 9. 62 See, e.g., Spong, supra note 6, at 24 ("narrow banks might represent the best structure for developing a more efficient and stable payments system."); James Burnham, Deposit Insurance: The Case for the Narrow Bank, 2 CATO REV. BUS. & GOV. 35, 37 (1991) (making narrow banks exclusive point of access for payments system would reduce risk of a major payment system failure).
63 Unsophisticated FDIC-insured savers are less likely to be unaware that they risk potentially catastrophic losses if they fail to open multiple bank accounts to circumvent the $250,000 coverage limitation or overlook a temporary deposit that causes their balance to exceed $250,000 (e.g., the proceeds of a home sale). In contrast, sophisticated depositors who monitor banks' financial health are likely to withdraw uninsured funds prior to the bank's failure, thereby increase losses for less savvy uninsured depositors. Under this proposal, the FDIC would insure 100 percent of MMF and narrow bank deposits that were subject to rule 2a-7 or (for narrow banks) similarly structured prudential rules. Unlike the temporary MMF insurance program, the insurance would be unconditional. It would not depend on the insured entity's compliance with applicable prudential rules or only to certain assets, as is the case with the temporary MMF program. The temporary program covers only assets that were eligible under rule 2a-7 at 64 See David Skeel, Governance in the Ruin, 122 HARV. L. REV. 696, 735 -36 (2008) (book review) ("because lending is done by so many other forms of intermediaries, the collapse of which could threaten the financial system, the narrow focus on commercial banks no longer makes sense"). See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 374 -75 ("somewhat anachronistic focus on banks, not markets, ignores new trends in the global marketplace. . . . . an exclusive bank-focused approach simply does not keep up with underlying changes in the financial system. In a financially disintermediated world, the old protections are no longer reliable."). 65 See generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON & MGMT SCIENCE 3 (1971) . The same insurance should be extended to narrow banks, that is, banks that invest deposits only in a diversified pool of high quality, shortterm debt in compliance with rule 2a-7 or similar prudential rules. These banks would be relieved of costly social obligations such as the CRA while 66 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1. Even stranger is the Treasury's position that an investor is covered in the amount of shares owned on September 19, even if all of those shares were sold and subsequently repurchased. Id. Thus, if a shareholder held 100 shares of insured Fund A on September 19 and transferred the investment to insured Fund B on September 20, the shareholder would have an incentive, if both Fund A and Fund B were about to break a dollar, to transfer assets from Fund B back to Fund A where it would be covered. It also appears that a MMF account in Fund A held in a 401(k) plan would not be covered if rolled over into an IRA. Id. This means that a forced rollover from a 401(k) plan could have the effect of stripping shareholders of insurance protection. 72 But see Miller, supra note 4, at 68 -69 (narrow banks were not offered in the past because of the absence of a short-term debt markets and are not offered today because this role has been served by MMFs). 73 See, e.g., Letter from Edward Yingling, American Bankers Association, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, regulatory oversight are an inevitable corollary of their safety and soundness mission. 74 Small banks would be a force to be reckoned with. A direct competitor, MMFs, would be 100 percent insured, as would narrow banks that larger banks might be more likely to have the wherewithal to create, while small banks were left with deposits subject to the $250,000 FDIC limit. If the deposit insurance limit increase to $250,000 has not been made permanent, doing so could be offered as a quid pro quo for small banks' acceptance of permanent MMF insurance. 75 Another alternative might be to make narrow banks available only to small banks. Even if the cost of creating narrow banks made it difficult for small banks to compete with MMFs, they nonetheless might gain a comparative advantage relative to large banks that might make the tradeoff worthwhile. Perhaps the assumption that small banks would not be able to offer competitive narrow banks is incorrect and they would find this option an attractive incentive.
One reason that permanent MMF insurance is a real possibility is that the alternatives pose even greater political and practical obstacles. The Treasury's creation of the temporary MMF insurance, like many of the recent, unprecedented governmental intrusions into the operation of U.S. financial markets, has irrevocably forced policymakers to 76 See Letter from Edward Yingling, supra note 11 ("money market mutual funds now have a permanent implicit government guaranty -much like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did"). choose between paths leading to fundamentally different destinations.
Some paths already have lead to an even greater role for government and a further shrinking of free markets, such as the recent increase of FDIC coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 (in the absence of any real threat of a run on banks). The ultimate decision regarding the fate of MMF insurance offers an opportunity to take a different path, a path of least insurance.
Providing unlimited FDIC insurance for MMFs and narrow banks subject to streamlined regulation would reduce taxpayer exposure and systemic risk, while promoting competition by expanding the market for the intermediation of short-term capital.
IV. Conclusion
The Treasury Department's creation of a temporary insurance 
